Estate of Hagmann, 60 T.C. No. 51 (1973), aff\u27d, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974) by Law Review, Florida State University
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 3 Article 8
Summer 1974
Estate of Hagmann, 60 T.C. No. 51 (1973), aff 'd,
492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974)
Florida State University Law Review
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation




Despite these difficulties, states have at least attempted to solve a
serious economic problem7 3 which Congress, until recently, has ignored.
In an area so strongly affected by mass communications and mass mer-
chandizing, however, it is inconceivable that any protection can be
either effective or appropriate without the national uniformity that
only Congress can impose. Considering the legal and practical problems
of state sound protection, as well as current congressional consideration
of comprehensive revisions of the Copyright Act of 1909,74 perhaps the
Goldstein Court would have been wiser to have invalidated the state
protective legislation and to have left the consideration of any future
protection to Congress. In 1908 the Supreme Court 5 used similar
tactics to prod Congress into passing the Copyright Act of 1909.8 While
the legitimate recording industry would not receive immediate relief
from their predatory competitors, the long-term effect of strong federal
copyright protection for sound recordings could far outweigh any ad-
verse short-term consequences.
Estate Tax-DEDUCTIONS-POST-DEATH EVENTS RELEVANT TO DE-
DUCTIBILITY OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO SECTION
2053 (a) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CoDE.-Estate of Hagmann, 60 T.C.
No. 51 (1973), af'd, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974).
Frank G. Hagmann died on November 8, 1965, owing $54,360 to
various creditors. None of the creditors, however, filed claims against
Hagmann's estate pursuant to the Florida nonclaim statute.'
v. Shultz, 482 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1973). The recordings at issue in Goldstein were
merely pirated recordings since there was no misrepresentation of their source. 412 U.S. at
549-50 n.4.
73. The House Judiciary Committee, reporting on the Sound Recording Amendments
of 1971, stated that the estimated volume of recording piracy exceeded $100 million per
year. See H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
74. See Copyright Law Revision Bill, S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
75. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
76. See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
1. FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1973), as amended, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-106, § 1. At the
time Hagmann's estate was administered, § 733.16 provided in pertinent part:
(1) No claim or demand, whether due or not, direct or contingent, liquidated
or unliquidated . . . shall be valid or binding upon an estate . . . unless the
same shall be in writing . . . and be filed in the office of the county judge granting
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Failure to file claims with the probate court during the nonclaim
period rendered the debts void and unenforceable against the estate
even though the debts were "bona fide and valid" against the decedent
at his death.2 Estate tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 permit a deduction from a decedent's gross estate for personal
obligations outstanding at his death3 and enforceable against the
estate under local law.4 Neither the statute nor the regulations, how-
ever, prescribe the date on which the enforceability and, therefore,
the deductibility of such claims is to be determined.5 Since the claims
were enforceable against Hagmann's estate at his death, his executrix
deducted the outstanding debts from the gross estate. The Government
disallowed the deductions because the claimants could never enforce
letters. Any such claim or demand not so filed within six (6) months from the
time of the first publication of the notice to creditors shall be void even though
the personal representative has recognized such claim or demand by paying a
portion.
Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-394, § 3.
Section 733.16 was amended and renumbered as §§ 733.702 and 733.703 in 1974.
See Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-106, § 1 (effective July 1, 1975). The new provisions reduce
the nonclaim period from six to four months and provide a three-year statute of limita-
tions for claims when no notice to creditors has been filed.
2. See Twomey v. Clausohm, 234 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1970). But cf. Adams v. Hacken-
sack Trust Co., 22 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1945); North v. Culmer, 193 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Davis v. Evans, 132 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961), which
allowed nonfiling creditors to proceed under a theory of equitable estoppel.
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a), which provides in part:
(a) General rule.-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value
of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross
estate such amounts-
(1) for funeral expenses,
(2) for administration expenses,
(3) for claims against the estate, and
(4) for unpaid mortgages on, or any indebtedness in respect of, property where
the value of the decedent's interest therein, undiminished by such mortgage
or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate,
as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the
United States, under which the estate is being administered.
(Emphasis added.)
The statute has not been significantly changed since enactment of the original
version. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 203, 39 Stat. 778.
4. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958), which provides in part:
The amounts that may be deducted as claims against a decedent's estate are
such only as represent personal obligations of the decedent existing at the time
of his death, whether or not then matured . . . Only claims enforceable against
the decedent's estate may be deducted.
5. The courts facing this issue have developed two distinct theories as to when
the enforceability and value of the claim are to be determined. Some cases have held
that the enforceability and the amount of the claim itself are to be determined by
facts in existence as of the date of the decedent's death. See note 12 infra. Others have
allowed events subsequent to the decedent's death to determine the enforceability and
amount of the claim. See note 27 infra.
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payment. Agreeing with the Government, the Tax Court in Estate of
Hagmann held that the claims were not deductible because the debts
had not been and would not be paid by the estate.
The estate, relying primarily on Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States,7
argued before the Tax Court that estate tax deductions are to be valued
as of the date of decedent's death and that subsequent events are
relevant only when the deduction is contingent or uncertain in amount
at the date of death. Ithaca Trust involved the valuation of a deduction
under section 403(a)(3) of the Revenue Act of 19188 for a bequest to
charity in the form of a charitable remainder trust. The life tenant
had survived the decedent, but died before the estate tax was due.
The executors and the Government agreed that the valuation of the
charitable deduction was to be determined by subtracting from the
value of the property placed in trust the value of the life estate.9 The
executors, however, argued that the life interest was to be determined
on the basis of the actual duration of the life tenancy, taking into
account the early death. The Government contended that the value
of the life interest must be determined actuarily, using only the facts
known at the testator's death. The Supreme Court agreed with the
Government.1 0
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, relied first on state court
authority for the rule developed in state inheritance tax cases that
split-interest bequests must be valued prospectively in accordance with
facts existing at the testator's death.1 Secondly, the opinion reaffirmed
6. 60 T.C. No. 51, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH TAx CT. REP. No. 32,019 at 2705,
afJ'd, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974).
7. 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
8. Ch. 18, § 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1098, which provided that certain charitable gifts
may be deducted in determining the net estate. The current version of § 403(a)(3) is
embodied in INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 2055(a). The charitable deduction allowed in
Ithaca Trust would no longer be available in identical circumstances. See Tax Reform
Act of 1969, ch. 91-172, § 201(d), 83 Stat. 487, amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055
(e)(2)(a).
9. 279 U.S. at 154-55.
10. The Court refused to recognize the "uncertain probabilities" that had since
become definite, and held that "the estate so far as may be is settled as of the date
of the testator's death." The Court reasoned that the value of property
depends largely on more or less certain prophecies of the future; and the value
is no less real at that time if later the prophecy turns out false than when it
comes out true. . . . Tempting as it is to correct uncertain probabilities by the
now certain fact, we are of the opinion that it cannot be done, but that the value
of the wife's life interest must be estimated by the mortality tables.
Id. at 155.
11. See id. The state court case cited, Hooper v. Bradford, 59 N.E. 678 (Mass. 1901),
enunciated the general rule that where the tax is on the transfer of property by death,
the rights of the parties in regard to the payment of the inheritance tax are to be
determined at the date of death. See also In re White's Estate, 101 N.E. 793 (N.Y.
19741
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the Supreme Court's previously stated position that the federal estate
tax is imposed on the act of transfer at death, not on the receipt of
property by legatees. 12 The Court then concluded that since the prop-
1913); Howe v. Howe, 61 N.E. 225 (Mass. 1901). These cases held that even though the
legatees' interests were subject to change during the administration and distribution
of the estate, the property vested at death in the legatees. Therefore, the nature of
the tax and the vesting at death required that the value of the property transferred
be determined at the date of death. Both Howe and White, however, recognize the
arbitrariness of the valuation date required by the nature of the taxing statute. The
rule is justified in White as a rule of "certainty and uniformity," not to be criticized
as causing a harsh result, because it can work both ways.
12. 279 U.S. at 155. The cases cited were Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61 (1924);
YMCA v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924); New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345
(1921); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900). None dealt with the valuation of divided
interests in property.
In Knowlton, which upheld the War Revenue Act of 1898, ch. 448, § 29, 30 Stat.
464, Justice White made a comprehensive survey of death taxes in English and American
history. He quoted from Hanson's Death Duties to define the nature of an estate tax:
" 'What it taxes is not the interest to which some person succeeds on a death, but the
interest which ceased by reason of the death.' " 178 U.S. at 49.
In Slocum the Court followed the Knowlton definition of the estate tax to prevent
the Government from disallowing a deduction for that portion of exempt charitable
devises used to pay the estate tax on the entire transfer. The Government theorized
that, since the tax levied was to come out of the portion of the estate going to the
charitable beneficiary, the only amount entitled to a charitable deduction should be
the amount the beneficiary would actually receive-that is, the devise less the amount
of estate tax paid by the beneficiary-and not the actual amount devised to the charitable
beneficiary. 264 U.S. at 62. The Court rejected this contention stating that the estate
tax "is not a tax upon a residue, it is a tax upon a transfer of his net estate by a
decedent." Id.
In Davis the charitable deduction was viewed by the Court as a statutory incentive
for the testator to choose a particular entity as the object of his bounty. YMCA v.
Davis, 264 U.S. 47, 50 (1924). The Court emphasized that Congress in enacting an
estate tax was approaching the transfers from the viewpoint of the testator dealing
with them before his death, not from the later point of view of the beneficiaries. Id.
Thus, the Court felt it immaterial to the deduction that the charitable beneficiary,
as a result of the estate tax, actually received less than the testator intended it to
receive.
In Eisner the Court's earlier decision in Knowlton was cited for the proposition that
an estate tax attaches to the estate before distribution, preceding the succession of the
legatees' interests. The Court held that the "charges" against the estate were only
charges that affect the estate as a whole and, therefore, did not include state succession
taxes on property the individual beneficiaries receive. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U.S. 345, 350 (1921). An argument may be made that the Eisner rationale would
allow post-death events occurring up to the time of computing the tax, but before
distribution, to be considered in the valuation of claims or charges against the estate.
The Court in Ithaca Trust ignored the earlier cases that had considered events
subsequent to death in evaluating charitable deductions. See, e.g., Herold v. Kahn, 159
F. 608 (3d Cir. 1908); Union Trust Co. v. Heiner, 19 F.2d 362 (W.D. Pa. 1927); Boston
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Nichols, 18 F.2d 660 (D. Mass. 1927). Herold v. Kahn was
justifiably ignored because it was decided under the War Revenue Act of 1898, ch.
448, § 29, 30 Stat. 464, which Knowlton v. Moore defined as a succession, not an estate,
tax. See 178 U.S. at 48-49, 65. Thus, Kahn correctly considered subsequent events to
determine the amounts actually received by the successors to the estate.
[Vol. 2
CASE COMMENTS
erty was transferred at death, and the tax incidence fell on the prop-
erty transferred, the deduction based on the property transferred to
the charity must be valued at the time when the taxable event, death,
occurred.'3
The facts of Hagmann arguably fall within the literal terms of
Ithaca Trust. If deductions are to be valued as of the date of the
testator's death, the subsequent unenforceability of the claim upon
which the deduction was based should not be considered. The Tax
Court in Hagmann, however, rejected a broad reading of the language
of Ithaca Trust.1" The court instead held that, for purposes of the
deduction for claims against the estate, subsequent events must be
considered and, under the facts presented in Hagmann, the deduction
had to be denied.' 5 In so deciding the Tax Court impliedly reversed
its previous conclusion that Ithaca Trust requires claims against the
estate to be determined only on facts existing at the date of death.' 6
Both Union Trust and Boston Safe Deposit involved the same issue as did Ithaca
Trust, in that the life tenant had survived the decedent but had died before the
estate tax was due; all three cases were decided under the same estate tax statute. The two
cases should have been troublesome to the Ithaca Trust Court because they held that
the statute did not necessarily contemplate that the value of his net estate be ascertained
as of the date of a decedent's death. The courts refused to use theoretical values when
the actual value was known at the time of computing the tax:
It would be manifestly unfair and unjust to use a theoretical life for the purpose
of determining the value of this life estate, which lasted only for 12 hours,
and when the actual determination of the life in question came to an end before
the actual computation of the net estate subject to tax required by the taxing
laws.
Union Trust Co. v. Heiner, 19 F.2d 362, 364 (W.D. Pa. 1927). The holding in Union
Trust was based partly on the court's opinion that the life tenancy never vested-
because the tenant died before the estate was administered-and partly on the belief
that the statute assumed the net estate would be ascertained at the date of tax compu-
tation. Id. at 363-64. This second reason is a logical interpretation of Eisner, supra.
The first reason, however, is in direct opposition to the rationale of the state in-
heritance tax cases, cited in Ithaca Trust, that held that the life estate vests at the
death of the testator. See note 11 supra. Thus, possibly because of the lack of federal
case law on valuation of divided interests in property, the Court in Ithaca Trust chose
to follow the rationale of the more experienced state courts. See Comment, Effect of
Events Subsequent to the Decedent's Death on the Valuation of Claims Against His
Estate Under Section 2053 of the Federal Estate Tax, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 770, 781.
13. 279 U.S. at 155.
14. The court in Hagmann stated:
Nevertheless, this Court and others have not been persuaded that the language
in such case establishes the broad proposition that in applying the estate tax pro-
visions, evidence of an event which occurred after the decedent's death is never
admissible.
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH TAx CT. REP. at 2704.
15. Id. at 2705.
16. See Estate of Donald E. Lester, Sr., 57 T.C. 503 (1972). This case held that
the principle of Ithaca Trust-valuation at the date of death-must control when the
probability of the occurrence of subsequent events which affect the claim is ascertainable
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At the same time, the court apparently embraced the better-reasoned
view of several court of appeals cases, 17 which had restricted the holding
of Ithaca Trust to questions of valuation in areas other than claims
against the estate.
The general rule established in Ithaca Trust, that deductions are
to be valued as of the date of decedent's death, has been modified in
a line of cases beginning with Jacobs v. Commissioner,"' decided just
six months after Ithaca Trust. In Jacobs the Second Circuit was faced
with the deductibility under section 403(a)(1)19 of a claim against
the estate that was certain both as to enforceability and amount
on the date of the decedent's death.2 0 Subsequent to the date of death,
however, the claimant elected to take a bequest under the decedent's
will in lieu of pressing her claim. Emphasizing that Congress intend-
ed section 403(a)(1) to deal with actual, not theoretical, claims, the
court refused to allow the estate to deduct the abandoned claim.
21
The Jacobs court distinguished Ithaca Trust on the basis of its
and is considered to value the claim. The only exception allowed is the contingent-
claim situation, where the claim is incapable of reasonable estimate and, therefore,
cannot be valued by acceptable methods at the date of death. See note 25 infra. Al-
though the Tax Court in Estate of Carlton A. Shively also held that Ithaca Trust
controlled, the decision was reversed on appeal. See Estate of Carlton A. Shively, 27
P-H TAX CT. MEM. 833 (1958), rev'd, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960).
Early in estate tax litigation, the predecessor of the Tax Court held that events
subsequent to the date of the decedent's death had to be considered to value claims
against the estate when the subsequent events indicated a change in the actual amount
of the claim that was enforceable against the estate. John Jacobs, Ex'r, 34 B.T.A. 594,
597 (1936) (tax claim extinguished by legislative act); Lucius N. Littauer, Ex'r, 25
B.T.A. 21, 28 (1931) (compromised medical bill). Thus, the Tax Court has not maintained
a consistent stance on the issue.
17. Commissioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960); Jacobs v. Commis-
sioner, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929). See also Gowetz v. Com-
missioner, 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963).
18. 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929).
19. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 403. 42 Stat. 279. This statute was similar to the
present INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a).
20. 34 F.2d at 233-34. The claimant was the decedent's widow. An antenuptial
contract entered into with the decedent provided that the widow, if she survived him,
would be paid $75,000 by his estate in lieu of her dower and marital rights. Under
the will, however, the widow had the option of receiving an income interest for life
in a trust in lieu of pressing her claim under the antenuptial contract.
21. In a famous passage relied on by later courts, the Second Circuit dismissed the
reasoning in Ithaca Trust as inapplicable to the area of claims against the estate:
Tax laws deal with actualities, and the rules prescribed by Congress are in-
tended to produce practical results, when applied by untechnical men. We think
actuality was the thought foremost in the mind of Congress when it put the
phrase "claims against the estate" in this and other Revenue Acts. The claims
which Congress intended to be deducted were actual claims, not theoretical ones.
34 F.2d at 235.
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own interpretation of the applicable statute.2 2 The court observed
that deductions for claims against a decedent's estate, and the deduc-
tion for a property interest devised to charity, were controlled by
different subsections of section 403.2S Section 403(a)(1) grants a de-
duction both for claims against the estate and for costs of administra-
tion; this latter deduction by its very nature contemplates considera-
tion of subsequent events which establish the deductible administra-
tion costs. Logically, therefore, Congress also must have intended that
post-death events be considered in establishing claims against the estate
that are deductible under the same subsection.24
Since the Jacobs decision, the courts have extended this approach
to two other factual situations. First, where claims against the estate
are disputed, or contingent as to either enforceability or amount, de-
ductions will not be allowed unless post-death events have established
the value of the claims.25 Since no method exists to value the deduc-
22. Id. at 236. The Second Circuit agreed with the description of the nature
of the federal estate tax and with the rationale of Ithaca Trust as it applied to the
valuation of property in the charitable deduction. Id.
23. Id.
24. The Jacobs opinion suggests as much. See id. See also Gowetz v. Commission-
er, 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963); Commissioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.
1960). In contrast, the charitable deduction in Ithaca Trust was taken pursuant to what
was then § 403(a)(3), no part of which by necessity implied a consideration of post-death
events. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 403, 42 Stat. 279.
25. In these cases the claim may be in dispute or contingent in two situations. The
existence of the claim may be conceded but its amount disputed or contingent on a
future event. Alternatively, the existence of a valid claim may be disputed. In the former
situation the question is how much of the claim will be enforced. In the latter situation
the question is whether a claim, whatever the amount, can be enforced at all. See, e.g.,
Estate of Reginald L. Taylor, 39 T.C. 371 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Gowetz v. Commission-
er, 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963) (claim being litigated when return was filed); Estate
of William P. Metcalf, 7 T.C. 153 (1946), af'd, 47-2 CCH U.S. TAx CAs. 766 (6th
Cir. 1947) (litigation and compromise); Estate of Ethel M. DuVal, 4 T.C. 722, afy'd,
152 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 838 (1946) (surety claim abandoned
when debtor appeared solvent); Estate of Charles H. Lay, 40 B.T.A. 522 (1939) (surety
claim and later settlement); Edythe C. Young, Ex'x, 39 B.T.A. 230 (1939) (disputed
divorce settlement claim).
Theoretically, in disputed, contingent or potential claim situations the Ithaca Trust
rationale does not preclude consideration of post-death events. Ithaca Trust only applies
when the claim is capable of valuation at the date of death, "as far as may be." As
long as the claim is incapable of valuation at the date of death, Ithaca Trust, by its
own language, should not apply. See Estate of Carlton A. Shively, 27 P-H TAx Cr. MEM.
833 (1958), rev'd, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960). Since the statute and the regulations
require the claim to be allowable and enforceable under local law, the courts, following
the approach of Jacobs v. Commissioner, have generally required a reasonable certainty
that the claim will be paid and an ability to value the claim without resort to uncertain
estimate. This necessarily requires a consideration of state law, which in turn may
depend on post-death events. See Smyth v. Erickson, 221 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1955).
If the claim is doubtful in existence or amount, the courts will not allow a deduction
unless it appears reasonably certain that the claim will be enforced against the estate
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tion in these cases without resort to uncertain estimate, the courts will
deny the deduction unless a consideration of post-death events will
establish the missing element.
In the second situation, more analogous to Hagmann, the existence
and amount of the claims are certain and, therefore, are capable of
valuation at the decedent's death. An event subsequent to death, how-
ever, may result in a change in the amount of the claim actually en-
and will be paid in a certain amount. See Estate of William P. Metcalf, 7 T.C. 153
(1946), ag'd, 47-2 CCH U.S. TAx CAS. 766 (6th Cir. 1947); Estate of Reginald L.
Taylor, 39 T.C. 371 (1962), af'd sub nom. Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874 (1st
Cir. 1963). Each involved a situation in which the existence of the claims was in dispute.
The compromised amount was allowed as the deduction on the general theory that
the outcome of the dispute must be looked to when it is uncertain that the estate
would ever pay any amount at all on the claim.
In other cases, where the estate is clearly liable for a claim under local law but
the amount of such liability is uncertain, the courts have looked to subsequent events
to ascertain the amount of liability. These cases acknowledged the deductibility of the
debt (especially where the creditor files a claim) but still considered subsequent events
in order to be reasonably certain that the claim would be paid or enforced. See, e.g.,
Estate of Ethel M. DuVal, 4 T.C. 722, aff'd, 152 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 838 (1946); Estate of Charles H. Lay, 40 B.T.A. 522 (1939); Estate of Harriet
Blair Borland, 38 B.T.A. 598 (1938); Percy B. Eckhart, Ex'r, 33 B.T.A. 426 (1935),
appeal dismissed, 91 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1937). These cases rely on the Jacobs "actuality"
rationale to justify a consideration of subsequent events, although the situation is not
necessarily controlled by Ithaca Trust inasmuch as the claims are incapable of valuation
at the date of death.
Although the emphasis is on actuality, these cases do not go so far as to require
actual payment or actual allowance by a court as a prerequisite to deductibility. See
Helvering v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 89 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1937). In
the area of executors' commissions and attorneys' fees neither the courts nor the regula-
tions require payment; a reasonable estimate is sufficient. See Estate of Alice K. Larkin,
13 T.C. 173 (1949); Stern v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 102 (1925); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2053-
3(b) to (c) (1958). The regulations impliedly allow a deduction for claims against
the estate that will be paid if the amount is based on a reasonably certain estimate:
An item may be entered on the return for deduction though its exact amount is
not then known, provided it is ascertainable with reasonable certainty, and will
be paid. No deduction may be taken upon the basis of a vague or uncertain
estimate.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (1958). No case has relied on this regulation as primary
authority. Thus, for both claims against the estate and expenses of administration,
reasonable certainty is required but actual payment is not.
With reference to claims against the estate, until a claimant asserts his right to
enforce payment by filing a claim within the period provided by the nonclaim statute,
see note 1 supra, a court cannot be assured of either the amount of the claim or of
its ultimate enforceability. If a claim is not filed within the prescribed period, a court
can be reasonably certain that no claim will be paid. But see note 2 supra. The filing
requirement establishes that a claimant exists; therefore, in the absence of further
disputes or other contingencies, the claim will be deemed ascertainable and deductible.
Thus, since the enforceability of the claim depends on actions by the claimant, subse-
quent events may be considered to determine the outcome of the uncertainty, i.e.,
what the claimant does.
[Vol. 2
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forceable against the estate.2 6 Generally these cases have followed the
Jacobs "actuality" approach to deny the deduction where subsequent
events show that the claim will not be enforced or paid in the amount
sought to be deducted.27
26. Since the estate, as far as may be, is settled at the date of death, it seems
logical that the Ithaca Trust rationale should be controlling. See Estate of Donald E.
Lester, Sr., 57 T.C. 503 (1972).
Examples fall into several categories:
(A) Relinquishment or extinguishment of the claim: Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320
F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963); Commissioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960). In
both cases, the former wife remarried after the decedent's death and, as a consequence,
her periodic alimony claim was forfeited and extinguished. See Jacobs v. Commissioner,
34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929) (claimant elected to take a
bequest under the decedent's will in lieu of pressing her claim); John Jacobs, Ex'r, 34
B.T.A. 594 (1936) (tax claim extinguished by legislative act).
(B) Payment by one other than the estate: Buck v. Helvering, 73 F.2d 760 (9th
Cir. 1934).
(C) Reduction in amount: Commissioner v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (1st
Cir. 1942) (estate agreed to pay ex-wife a lump sum plus reduced monthly payments);
Estate of Isaac W. Baldwin, 28 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 779 (1959) (partnership debts
compromised); Lucius N. Littauer, Ex'r, 25 B.T.A. 21, 28 (1931) (medical bill settled
at a lower amount).
(D) Failure to file the claim with the probate court: Russell v. United States, 260
F. Supp. 493 (N.D. 111. 1966); Winer v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(both cases involved claims that were filed after the statutory period for such claims
had expired); Estate of Annie Feder, 22 T.C. 30 (1954) (valid claims not filed because
claimants were the beneficiaries of the estate); Estate of Carolyn J. Clement, 13 T.C.
19 (1949) (under New York law the claims were not prejudiced by failure to file). In
both Clement and Feder, the Tax Court refused to follow the Jacobs "actuality" ap-
proach, which would have required a filing. In Feder, the beneficiaries elected to take
under the will rather than as claimants. Thus, as a matter of economic benefit, the
claim was paid.
In the recent case of Estate of Quntard Peters Courtney, 62 T.C. No. 39, [1974
Transfer Binder] CCH TAx CT. REP. No. 32,639, decided in June 1974, no claim was filed
against the estate because the decedent's wife continued making the regular payments
on the note. The Tax Court, citing both Jacobs and Hagmann, held that since no claim
had been filed the estate was not entitled to a deduction.
27. Even though the claim is capable of valuation at death, the cases follow
Jacobs and acknowledge that the statutory scheme envisions consideration of post-death
events to value claims against the estate. See Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874 (1st
Cir. 1963); Commissioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960). The pervasive
rationale running throughout the cases is that the estate should not be allowed to deduct
a claim that it will never pay because of events that occurred during the administration
of the estate. See Commissioner v. Estate of Shively, supra; Commissioner v. State Street
Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942); Buck v. Helvering, 73 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1934);
John Jacobs, Ex'r, 34 B.T.A. 594 (1936). The importance of these decisions, however, is
their ready acceptance of the statutory interpretation argument in Jacobs, and the con-
comitant limitation of the Ithaca Trust rationale.
The treatment of one recent case in the Tax Court and on appeal to the circuit
court illustrates the basic difference of opinion in the area of valuing claims against
the estate. In Estate of Reginald L. Taylor, 39 T.C. 371, 375 (1962), the Tax Court
considered post-death events to value a claim against the estate solely because the claim
was "properly" disputed. The First Circuit, although affirming the result in Taylor,
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
disagreed with the Tax Court's basis of decision. Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874,
876 (1st Cir. 1963). The Gowetz opinion, following the rationale in Jacobs, implied that
the statute allows consideration of post-death events for purposes of valuing a claim
against the estate whether or not the claim was disputed or contingent at the death of
the testator.
The basic difference in outlook between the Tax Court and the circuit courts is
also seen in the reversal of a Tax Court opinion in Commissioner v. Estate of Shively, 276
F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960). In Shively the Second Circuit reaffirmed the theory of statutory
interpretation as a basis for distinguishing Ithaca Trust in the claims area. See 276 F.2d
at 374-75. The court stressed that the section allowing a deduction for claims against
the estate was intended by Congress to be applied in conjunction with state laws in
order to establish the amount of the claim "irrespective of whether this amount is
established through events occurring before or after the decedent's death." 276 F.2d
at 375.
In addition, the Shively court suggested another reason to limit Ithaca Trust to
charitable deductions. According to Shively, a claim against the estate is deductible
only because it is a portion of the gross estate that did not pass by way of gift to
the objects of the testator's bounty. See 276 F.2d at 375. The Shively court relied on
Kahn v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), for this characterization of
claims against the estate. On the other hand, a charitable bequest is deductible because
the testator has directed that specific property or a specific amount of money or prop-
erty be transferred to charity at his death. In the latter case, the issue is viewed as a
question of valuation of a property interest included in the gross estate and passing
to charity, the object of the testator's bounty. The former case is more properly viewed
as a question of what circumstances lead to a reduction in the amount of the estate
actually reaching the objects of the testator's bounty. The court in Shively indicated
that, in the case of claims against the estate, post-death events that effect the ultimate
estate to be enjoyed by the testator's designated beneficiaries should be taken into
account. See 276 F.2d at 375. According to the opinion:
[The purpose of the statute] is to define that portion of the property of a de-
cedent that is subject to estate tax, and in so doing it eliminates from estate
taxation those portions of the decedent's gross estate that do not pass by way
of gift taking effect at death, and those portions that, although they do so pass,
pass by way of tax-exempt gift. . . . Obviously this purpose would not be served
if a deduction were permitted for claims against an estate which, though having
vitality as of date of death, could never be enforced as of the date the estate
tax return is filed. . . . To permit an estate such a deduction under these
circumstances would be to prefer fiction to reality and would defeat the clear
purpose of Section 812.
Id.
In the case of the charitable deduction, the value of the property in the gross
estate that is devised to charity will be exempt from estate taxation. The deduction
is probably contemplated before death by the testator as an integral part of an estate
planning scheme that effectuates his desires and also takes advantage of favorable tax
treatment. The charitable deduction is a direct gift of property and should be accorded
the same treatment as other property included in the gross estate and passing as gifts
at death. Therefore, since under INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 2031-32, property included
in the gross estate must be valued at the date of death or six months after death at
the alternate valuation date, it is reasonable that the property passing at death as a
gift to charity also should be valued at death.
Conversely, a claim against the estate is not a specific quantity which the testator
devises to a legatee. It is an amount that a third party claimant or creditor takes
away from the amount of property passing as gifts to legatees. Even though a statute
or the testator may provide for payment of a claim from specific property in the estate,
such provision is not a devise of the property. The payment or enforcement of the
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The Tax Court in Hagmann cited cases from both of the preceding
lines of authority to support its conclusion that subsequent events
must be considered in deciding whether to deny the deduction. The
opinion makes no distinction between the contingent claim cases28 and
those cases that dealt with the ultimate issue in Hagmann, namely,
whether a court may properly consider subsequent events to value a
claim when that claim was enforceable and determinable in amount
at the date of the decedent's death.29 The Tax Court's treatment of
its own earlier decisions and of two contrary district court cases, how-
ever, clearly indicates the emphasis of future Tax Court decisions on
the question of valuation.
First, the court reinterpreted its earlier, entrenched view of Ithaca
Trust, which had required valuation of every claim from the facts
existing at the date of death; subsequent events had been considered
only if the court first classified the claim as contingent or disputed
and, therefore, incapable of valuation from the facts existing at death.30
Applying this theory, the Tax Court could have justified denial of the
deductions by characterizing the claim as contingent during the non-
claim period, since no claim can be enforced against an estate unless
the applicable statutory requirements are met."' Instead, the Tax
claim depends, in the final analysis, on the action of the claimant in asserting his
claim, and not on the action of the testator in transferring his property at death. In
most states a general creditor is required to file his claim within a specific period or
the claim is barred notwithstanding that the general statute of limitations otherwise
applicable to his claim has not run. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH
TRANsAcrIoNs: WILLS, TRUsTs, FUTURE INTERESTs, AND ESTATE PLANNING 85 (1972); see
note I supra. The administrators of the estate serve in a fiduciary capacity toward the
estate beneficiaries and must protect the assets of the estate. Claims must be asserted
and enforceable before an executor can pay them without fear of personal liability. See
FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS, supra at 82-86. The Supreme Court, in Helvering v.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56, 65 (1942), indicated that, in the situation where
the value of the estate depended upon actions of persons other than the testator or
the administrator of his estate, subsequent events could be considered to value the
estate.
Since the charitable deduction depends upon the act of the testator and the de-
duction for claims against the estate depends upon the action of claimants after the
testator's death, the difference in nature between the two is inherent; it is logical to
value the deductions according to their respective natures. The distinction between
the charitable deduction and the claim against the estate deduction, as suggested in
Jacobs, thus is justified on the basis of differences in the applicable statutes, and be-
cause of the differing nature of the two types of deductions.
28. In these cases the Tax Court had been careful to classify the claims as disputed
or contingent before it considered post-death events to value them. See note 25 supra.
29. See notes 26-27 supra.
30. See note 16 supra.
31. In Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960-2 Curs. BULL. 272, the Internal Revenue Service ad-
vanced this theory, suggesting that the claim was a conditional liability. When the
claim is filed, it becomes a liability. Such a result easily could have been squared with
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Court moved away from such characterizations and held that the con-
tingent claim cases were "based on the proposition that in computing
the net estate subject to taxation, merely technical claims which dis-
appear in the light of subsequent circumstances should not be al-
lowed .... ,,32 The court also expressly rejected Russell v. United
Statess5 and Winer v. United States,"4 which held, on facts similar to
those in Hagmann, that section 2053(a)(3) does not contemplate con-
sideration of post-death events to determine the "allowability" of
claims against the estate. The court in Hagmann disapproved of these
cases because they "applied the broad doctrine of Ithaca Trust Co.,
without considering the cases which limited the applicability of such
doctrine in the area of claims against the estate."35
By its rejection of the Winer-Russell rationale and modification of
its own previous Ithaca Trust theory, the Tax Court in Hagmann
signified its acceptance of the statutory interpretation argument made
in Jacobs v. Commissioner." Under Hagmann deductibility of claims
the Tax Court's contingent claim cases. For example, in Estate of Mary Redding Shedd,
37 T.C. 394 (1961), afl'd, 320 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1963), the Tax Court indicated that a
claim would be deemed uncertain if no claim actually were presented.
32. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. at 2705.
33. 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Il1. 1966).
34. 153 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). In both Russell and Winer, claims against the
estates were made after the statutory filing period had expired. The courts in those
cases decided that the Ithaca Trust doctrine-" [t]he estate so far as may be is settled
as of the date of the testator's death," 279 U.S. at 155-controlled and that the en-
forceability of claims against the estate must be determined at the date of the de-
cedent's death. The courts relied heavily upon the language of the section providing
a deduction for claims against the estate:
[The section provides] for deductions from the gross estate of such claims
against the estate "as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction * * 0 under
which the estate is being administered." The persuasive weight of the case
law is to the effect that this language must be read to refer to such claims "as
are allowable [at the time of the decedent's death] under the laws of the juris-
diction where the estate is being administered."
Russell v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 493, 499 (N.D. Ill. 1966). See Winer v. United
States, 153 F. Supp. 941, 943-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The cases cited to support this proposi-
tion, however, decide only that the claim need not be allowed by the state court in
order to be deductible-they do not decide that the determination of enforceability is
to be made at the date of death. See Smyth v. Erickson, 221 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1955);
Commissioner v. Strauss, 77 F.2d 401, 405 (7th Cir. 1935). Smyth and Erickson do not
conflict with Jacobs v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603
(1929), which clearly does not require actual payment or an actual court decree. Jacobs
only requires certainty that the amount will be paid. Finally, neither case has been
reviewed by an appellate court. Therefore, both Winer and Russell were correctly re-
jected by Hagmann. See Note, EbFect of Events Subsequent to the Decedent's Death on
the Valuation of Claims Against His Estate Under Section 2053 of the Federal Estate
Tax, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 770; Comment, Federal Estate Tax: Effect of Subsequent Events
on the Valuation of Claims Against the Estate, 1961 Du L.J. 474, 478 n.20.
35. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. at 2705.
36. See notes 22-25, 28 and accompanying text supra.
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against the estate will no longer turn on the enforceability of the claim
on the date of the decedent's death. Regardless of the nature of claim,
the court will determine its deductibility under the tax code by evalua-
tion of the events occurring subsequent to death.
The result in Hagmann is not an unreasonable interpretation of
statutory intent. The estate tax was traditionally regarded as a levy
on the transfer of property at the death of its owner, and not on the
interests to which the legatees succeed.3 7 But case law developments
and the statutory trend have since moved toward an analysis of the
economic benefit conferred on the legatees (the "actuality" approach)
to determine the deductions from the gross estate. 8 Because of such
provisions as the nonclaim statute, the period of estate administration
is the logical post-death period during which the modem approach
can be used to determine the enforceability of claims against the estate
and, therefore, the ultimate economic benefit to the legatees3 9
There are several compelling statutory indications that the Jacobs
opinion correctly interpreted legislative intent. Congress has enacted
several provisions that shift the emphasis on the valuation of deduc-
tions to focus more precisely on the economic benefits flowing to the
decedent's successors. First, in quick response to cases relied on in
Ithaca Trust for the principle that the tax is not on the receipt of prop-
erty by the legatees,40 Congress limited the charitable deduction to
the amount of the devise actually received by the charity."1 Before the
37. See notes 11 & 12 supra.
38. Since Jacobs the case authority in the circuit courts of appeals has recognized
that statutory treatment accorded the deduction for claims against the estate differs
from the charitable deduction in Ithaca Trust. See notes 22-25, 28 and accompanying
text supra. Some cases have cited Jacobs without further distinguishing Ithaca Trust. As
demonstrated in Shively, these cases stress actuality in determining reductions from
the amounts devised to the legatees. See note 27 supra. Implied by such an actuality
approach is a consideration of the economic benefits that will pass to the legatees. Al-
though actual enforceability of such claims is required, payment of the claims is not
essential. See Estate of Emelil Bankhead, 60 T.C. No. 59, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
TAX CT. REP. No. 32,042, which suggests an economic benefit approach to cancelled in-
debtedness of an estate for income tax purposes.
39. It is during the administration period that the executor must manage and
protect the estate's assets and pay its debts, taxes and administration expenses in order
to determine the assets available for distribution to the legatees. J. DUKEMINIER & S.
JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRusTs, FuruRE INTERESTS, AND ESTATE
PLANNING 82-86 (1972).
40. See Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61 (1924); YMCA v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924);
note 12 supra.
41. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 303(a)(3), 43 Stat. 306, which provided:
If the tax imposed by section 301, or any estate, succession, legacy, or inheritance
taxes, are, either by the terms of the will, by the law of the jurisdiction under
which the estate is administered, or by the law of the jurisdiction imposing the
particular tax, payable in whole or in part out of the bequests, legacies, or de-
vises otherwise deductible under this paragraph, then the amount deductible
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amendment, the Court had allowed a deduction for the full amount
of the bequest to charity regardless of the fact that the estate taxes
for the entire transfer were paid out of the residuum that went to
charity. Secondly, in a 1942 amendment to the predecessor of section
2053(c)(2),12 Congress reacted to settled authority in the circuit courts
of appeals that allowed the deduction for claims against the estate
even though the assets of the estate were unavailable to the claimant's
creditors. 43 The amendment corrected this situation by denying the
deduction unless the claims were in fact paid or could be paid from
the estate assets.
One final indication of congressional intent may be found in the
marital deduction provisions. The value of the deduction must be
determined by deducting from the surviving spouse's interest any
estate, succession, legacy or inheritance taxes imposed on the property
by any government and any encumbrance imposed on the property
by the decedent with respect to the passing of the interest." Thus
valuation for this deduction emphasizes the actual economic benefits
received by the legatee. These provisions evince explicit congressional
intent to shift the focus of the deduction to the economic benefits
actually flowing to the legatees, as determined by subsequent events.
The Hagmann decision resolves a disruptive conflict that has per-
under this paragraph shall be the amount of such bequests, legacies, or devises
reduced by the amount of such taxes ....
It is clear that the enactment was intended as the legislative reversal of Edwards v.
Slocum, 264 U.S. 61 (1924). Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., Ex'rs, 317 U.S. 476 (1943).
See S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 and H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 49-50, accompanying the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 807, 47 Stat. 282, which
restored the 1924 provision, supra, after the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 323, 44 Stat.
pt. 2, at 9, had repealed it. The provision is currently embodied in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2055(c). "The amount of the charitable deduction is, in effect, measured by the amount
the charity actually receives and not by the gross amount of the bequest." 4 J. MERTENS,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFr AND ESTATE TAXATION § 30.06, at 654-55 (1959) (footnotes
omitted).
42. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 405(a), 56 Stat. 945, amending Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 812(b).
43. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Hallock, 102 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1939); Commissioner
v. Lyne, 90 F.2d 745 (lst Cir. 1937); Commissioner v. Windrow, 89 F.2d 69 (5th Cir.
1937). Windrow reasoned that the legal existence of a claim against the estate was not
affected by the claim's actual collectability. Even though Windrow has since been
nullified by the 1942 amendment, one commentator seems to attach continuing signifi-
cance to its reasoning. See 4 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GiFT AND ESTATE TAXA-
TION § 26.25, at 76 n.17 (1959). In its brief before the Fifth Circuit, the estate relied
heavily on the continuing validity of Windrow as Fifth Circuit precedent. See Brief for
Appellant at 35-37, 51-58, Hagmann v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974). The
per curiam affirmance by the Fifth Circuit of the Tax Court's opinion in Hagmann
indicates that Congress' nullification of Windrow's result also nullified its rationale.
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(4)(A)-(B). See 4 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 30.01 (1959).
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sisted between the Tax Court and some courts of appeals." To this
extent the decision lends certainty to the settlement of estates. The
decision, however, will require the executor of an estate in Florida
to wait until either the nonclaim period has passed, or the claim is
filed or paid, before he can determine the validity of a deduction for
claims against the estate. Because ultimate disposition of the claim
is the focus in Hagmann, an executor may be required to wait even
beyond the nonclaim period if a properly filed claim is formally dis-
puted by the estate, or is contingent or uncertain in amount.46 This
detrimental aspect of the decision assumes less importance, however,
when it is considered in the light of current administrative delays in
the handling of estate tax returns' 7 These existing delays indicate that
45. The rash of conflicting decisions concerning the valuation of claims against
the estate, beginning with Winer v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
has led one commentator to state:
The scope of the rule that allowability of a claim under state law is determin-
able as of the date of decedent's death is still unsettled, as is the subsidiary question
of whether a claim which was valid and enforceable on the date of death is
deductible where it is subsequently lost by failure to timely present it.
4 J. MmmTNs, THE LAw OF FEDaL Giwr AND EsTATE TAXATION § 26.16, at 7 (Cum.
Supp. 1972) (footnote omitted). The issue of presenting claims may now be considered
settled in the Tax Court.
Nonclaim statutes were enacted pursuant to a policy of speedy and final deter-
minations of estates for the benefit of the interested parties. In re Williamson's Estate,
95 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1957). Therefore, by making the method of determining estate
tax liability more certain, beneficiaries will be assured that the amount they receive
will not be subject to later tax deficiencies.
46. If the claim is disputed by the estate or the creditor, or the amount is not
reasonably certain (e.g., a surety situation), mere filing will not be enough to settle
the issue of deductibility. See note 25 supra. In light of possible estoppel theories under
the nonclaim statute, the creditor also may be able to overcome the statutory bar
if he failed to file his claim. Adams v. Hackensack Trust Co., 22 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1945).
In a case where a denied deduction is eventually paid because of a successful estoppel
argument or because a dispute was finally settled, the regulations allow the estate to
petition for relief. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (1958). The petition for relief must
conform to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6511(a), which permits such petitions for three
-years from the date the return is filed or two years from the date the tax is paid, which-
ever is later.
The problem with the cases allowing consideration of subsequent events to value
claims against the estate is their failure to agree upon the proper cut-off date. Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1960), set the cut-off date at the tax
return date. Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874, 876 (1st Cir. 1963), expressly declined
to address the problem. The Tax Court in Hagmann dealt only with a nonclaim
period that had passed before the estate tax return date. See [1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH TAX CT. RE. at 2704-05. The Tax Court failed to consider any other cut-off
problems. For a discussion of the cut-off problem see Comment, Federal Estate Tax:
Effect of Subsequent Events on the Valuation of Claims Against the Estate, 1961 DUKE
L.J. 474.
47. The filing period in Florida is four months from the issuance of notice to
creditors. See note 1 supra. Two of the most significant factors tending to prolong estate
administration are nonclaim statutes and the fderal tax return procedures. To pre-
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any impediment resulting from the Hagmann decision will not actual-
ly prolong the final distribution of the assets of an estate.
Criminal Law-STATUTORY IMMUNITY-USE OF TESTIMONY PROVIDED
PURSUANT TO FLORIDA IMMUNITY STATUTE PROHIBITED IN SUBSEQUENT
CRIMINAL OR CIVIL PROCEEDING INITIATED AGAINST DECLARANT BY
STATE.-Lurie v. Florida State Board of Dentistry, 288 So. 2d 223 (Fla.
1973).
Dr. Jack Lurie, a dentist, was compelled to testify before the Bre-
vard County Solicitor regarding alleged illegal transactions concerning
stolen automobiles.' One year later Lurie was informed against for re-
ceiving a stolen automobile and aiding in the concealment of stolen
property. He sought a writ of prohibition from the Fourth District
Court of Appeal contending that he was immune from criminal pros-
ecution under Florida's transactional immunity statute.2 The court
vent personal liability for claims, the prudent executor will not close the administra-
tion and distribute the assets until the nonclaim period has elapsed. J. DUKEMINIER & S.
JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRusTs, FuTuRE INTERESTS, AND ESTATE
PLANNING 83 (1972). Also, to prevent personal liability for his obligation to pay the estate
tax the executor should wait until the return has been audited and approved by the
government before he distributes the assets. Since the Internal Revenue Service is running
approximately one year behind schedule in its audits, id. at 83-84, the consideration of
post-death events in connection with the nonclaim statute will have no significant effect
on the time of final distribution of estate assets.
1. Arnold Rosenbaum was charged with possession of stolen property and making a
false statement on an application for an auto title certificate. His trial on the charges
resulted in a hung jury. In order to secure additional witnesses for the retrial, the as-
sistant county solicitor of Brevard County then subpoenaed Lurie and his son, who were
questioned under oath about their knowledge of Rosenbaum's activities and about the
elder Lurie's acquisition of two autos from Rosenbaum. State ex rel. Lurie v. Rosier, 226
So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
2. FLA. STAT. § 932.29 (1967) provided:
No person shall be excused from attending and testifying, or producing any
book, paper or other document before any court upon any investigation, proceeding
or trial, for a violation of any of the statutes of this state against bribery, burglary,
larceny, gaming or gambling, or of any of the statutes against the illegal sale of
spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, upon the ground or for the reason that the
testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to
convict him of a crime or to subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, but no person
shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
